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Marasinghe: An Empiricist's View of the Chinese Legal System

AN EMPIRICIST'S VIEW OF THE
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
M.L. MARASINGHE*t

In any given society there are certain elements which indicate
the existence of a legal system. Of these, three elements appear
universally true. First, there must be the modalities by which law is
regularly established.' Second, there must be the modalities by
which existing law could be repealed or amended.2 Third, there must
be recognized organs of state power which may be used within an
established framework of laws to enforce the laws and punish their
breaches.' The latter primarily distinguishes arbitrary acts by state
organs from lawful and controlled acts.
Within these basic parameters there is a wide area for variation among modern societies. In the West, the legal institutions
stand separate and are identifiably distinguished from other institutions; Montesquieu would describe this as "separation of powers."'
In China, these three elements which determine and identify a legal
system do exist as a fact. But the roles played by each of the three
compartments of government concerned with the three aforementioned elements tend to become merged with each other, and with
the surrounding socio-political structure. In a sense, therefore, they
are not separate and are often indistinguishable. The result could be
the politicization of the judicial organs of the state to the extent
that the system of "dispute settlement" becomes arbitrary and corrupt.
The Chinese attempt to check this evil by submitting the law
and its institutions to the control of the society, as politically con-

*Professor of Law, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
tThis paper was written during the tenure of a senior research fellowship
awarded by the Max-Planck Institute for Private International Law, in Hamburg,
West Germany during the summer of 1979. The author wishes to acknowledge with
gratitude the help and guidance given by Dr. Frank Miinzel (Research Associate, MaxPlanck Institute) during many valuable hours of discussion and elucidation. The author
retains sole responsibility for all errors.
1. These constitute the primary rules in Hart's analysis. See H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961).o

2. Id.
3. Id. These would fall under the secondary rules of Hart's analysis.
4.
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ceived through popular participation.' Realizing the difficulty of
achieving popular participation with a population of nearly 900
million, the Chinese Communist Party introduced to a very substantial extent a method of decentralization. This method of decentralization was essentially a question of expediency, when, during
the lengthy struggle with the Kuo-min-tang forces, the Red Army
was compelled to organize village by village, after their capture, so
that each village remained an independent socio-economic unit,
governing itself. This enabled the Red Army to move along, leaving
behind an organization in each village capable of carrying on independently of the rest of the country. By the end of the revolution,
these micro-organizations had become so well established that the
need at that stage was merely to formulate a basis upon which they
could be integrated, socially, politically, economically and legally;
this integration became known in 1949 as The People's Republic of
China. The study of the legal system of China includes as its core
element a study of the social organizations that had emerged, in particular, during the period spanning what has now come to be known
as "The Cultural Revolution;" the period between 1966-1976.
This paper is devoted to the study of those institutions and
their interrelationships. The study is based on extensive field work
conducted in the People's Republic of China during two visits to the
mainland in 19756 and 1977.1 The nature of the field work consisted
of observing the workings of the communes, factories and schools
and conducting both direct and indirect interviews with persons in
the branch organizations8 of the Communist Party of China. Interviews with some foreign persons who had then been longstanding
residents of Peking, Shanghai and Canton also produced exceedingly
useful data. the unavailability of published documents was compensated for by utilizing the private archives and notes of persons who
were residents at the time in China. The paper, therefore, is based
upon empirical data and shall rely on primary sources wherever
possible.
5. J.R. TOWNSEND, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA ch. 4 (1968);
4 MODERN CHINA 3-62 (1978).
6. The 1975 visit included communes and factories in the provinces of
Kwangsi and Kwangtung in the south. Chekiang and Kiangsu in the east and the
municipality of Peking.
7. The 1975 visit included communes and factories in the provinces of Liaoning, Shansi, Honan, Hunan and provinces of Liaoning in the north, Honan, Hupeh and
Hunan in the middle.
8. These are the various "revolutionary committees" of the communes, factories and schools.
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AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE INSTITUTIONS
9
WHICH DEAL WITH LAW

During the pre-1949 period China espoused no established legal
traditions. The Chinese socio-political system during the prerevolutionary days was seeped in Confucian philosophy. However, by
1949 the Kuo-min-tang government had reduced the civil and criminal laws of China into six codes. These codes were referred to as Fa,
or enacted law. Li, a system of values based on exemplary behavior,
was practically non-existent towards the end of the revolution. The
deep political turmoil through which the Chinese society had passed,
ever since the first shots of the revolution were fired by Mao Tsetung in 1945, opened the flood gates of enacted law, or Fa, but produced no increase of the principle of guidance through exemplary
behavior, or Li. The six codes into which the Kuo-min-tang government had reduced the laws of China by 1949, therefore, were viewed
by the Communist Party as abhorent and thoroughly evil.
Thus, in February, 1949, on the eve of the birth of "New
China," the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
published a document: The Directive on the Abolition of the Six-law
Codes of the Kuo-min-tang and the Definition of the Principles in
Judicial Work of the Liberated Areas."0 By this directive the central
Committee expressly declared:
[Tihe six-law codes of the Kuo-min-tang must be abolished
in the jurisdiction of people's democratic dictatorship led
by the proletariat and with the alliance of workers and
peasants as its mainstay [and] as the people's law is not
yet rounded out, the guiding principles of the judicial
organs in their work should be: where programmes, laws,
decrees, regulations and resolutions have laid down provisions, they should be observed; where no programmes,
laws, decrees, regulations or resolutions have made any
provisions, they should follow the policies of the New
Democracy. 1
9. This section is partly based on interviews conducted among members of
the Law Department in the University of Peking and also from a recent publication
given to me, namely: SHOUYI, A REVIEW OF LEGAL SCIENCE IN NEW CHINA FOR THIRTY
YEARS, 1 Researches on Law (Peking Univ. 1980). The author is presently Professor
and Dean of the Department of Law in University of Peking and is also a member of
the Legal Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress (which means a
member of Parliament).
10. Shouy, supra note 9, at 1-2.
11. Id.
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This decree, which was issued some six months before the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, may be
considered as providing a basis for the construction and evolution of
the post-revolutionary legal system of China. In fact, due to the exigencies of the revolution, the Communist Party was unable to provide for "programmes, laws, decrees, regulations or resolutions" in
any substantial way. Therefore, the administration of justice under
early Communist rule took more the appearance of Li based on the
elements of "The New Democracy" rather than of Fa, which the party
had little or no time to enact.
The period between 1949 and 1954 saw a large number of
criminal trials in China proceeding along somewhat arbitrary lines.
The reason for this may be found in the absence of a settled view on
what constitutes "the policies of New Democracy." The absence of
enacted law left the tribunals of justice to rely on this "catch
phrase," and therefore regional and often district variations in interpretation became startingly apparent. Realizing the apparent
disparities in the administration of justice, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party drafted an "inter-party circular" urging the
tribunals of justice: "As a general rule, before passing a death
sentence, refer the case to the masses and consult democratic personages. Exercise strict control, guard against indiscriminate action
and avoid mistakes."" The submission of the facts constituting the
offense charged to the masses was encouraged from a very early
point of time of Communist rule in China. A few weeks before the
above "inter-party circular" was distributed, the Central Committee
issued the following directives to the tribunals urging care and caution in sentencing people to death:
Please make certain that you act surely, accurately and
relentlessly in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries."3
One batch of bandit chieftains, local tyrants and secret
agents has been executed in twenty-one counties in
Western Hunan, and another batch is to be executed by
local authorities this year.-To strike surely means to pay
attention to [facts]. To strike accurately means to avoid
wrong executions. To strike relentlessly means resolutely
to kill all such reactionary elements as [do] deserve the
12. 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 46 (1977). The inter-party circular in
question was issued on February 18, 1951.
13. Id. at 53 (dated December 19, 1950).
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death penalty (of course, those who don't will not be executed). So long as we avoid wrong executions, we don't
have to worry even if the bourgeoisie raises an outcry.1'

By 1954, although a large body of Li had grown during the
previous few years of Communist rule, the Chinese government was
conscious of the arbitrary nature of the country's criminal jurisdiction. This the government considered as a hindrance for the much
needed diplomatic offensive that they had launched in order to win
recognition on the world stage. Therefore, in 1954, four years after
the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship with
the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party decided to adopt en
bloc the Soviet laws and legal institutions causing a massive influx
of Fa, or enacted law, into the country. 15 As a part of the responsibilities assumed by the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship, Stalin sent to China in 1954 a number of lawyers and law
teachers to help the Chinese to place their new legal institutions
upon a stable footing. To further support the move towards an
ordered system of laws and judicial administration, the Chinese
Communist Party (which was also the government) in 1956 adopted
a new Constitution for The People's Republic of China modeled on
the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union.
Two of the early codes to emerge out of Communist rule in
China were The Marriage Law of 1950 and The Land Reform Law
also of 1950. But not until August 29, 1958, did the Communist Party
consider it opportune to recognize the existence of mutual aid teams
and agricultural producers' co-ops, which were the starting points
for the rural communes of China."6 Mao Tse-tung, having first visited
the Chili-yang "Peoples Commune" on August 6, 1958, declared in a
speech to the Shantung Provincial Committee of the Communist
Party three days later: "It is good to set up People's communes.
Their advantage is that they combine industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military affairs, thus making the task of
leadership easier." 7 Twenty days later Mao Tse-tung moved before
the Political Bureau of the party's Central Committee a resolution
on the establishment of People's Communes in the rural areas. This
proved to be a mere recognition of a reality that had come into ex14. Id. (dated January 17, 1951).
15. D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1979).
16. For a useful historical sketch as to the evolution of the rural commune see
C. Li. T. CHIEH-YUAN, INSIDE A PEOPLE'S COMMUNE 5-31 (1974). See also F. GREENE,
A CURTAIN OF IGNORANCE 143-65 (1968).
17. C. LI, T. CHIEH-YUAN, supra note 16, at 6.
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istence as a result of the Land Reform Law of 1950,18 under which
"[t~he feudal exploitative system of land ownership by landlord class
shall be abolished and the system of peasant land ownership shall be
introduced in order to set free the rural productive forces, develop
agricultural production
and pave the way for New China's in19
dustrialization."
By a resolution moved before the sixth plenary session of the
Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on
December 10, 1958, the establishment of communes as a new social
organization was confirmed. In moving the resolution, Mao Tse-tung
declared: "A new social organization has appeared, fresh as the
morning sun, above the broad horizon of East Asia."' As the rest of
this article shall show, the commune formed the "basic socio-legal
unit" which in due course became a central laboratory for socio-legal
research in China.
With the affluxion of time and particularly during the cultural
revolution (of 1966-1976) new dimensions and new strains were added
to the Chinese legal system. Particularly, in the administration of
criminal justice the Chinese jurists began utilizing sociological and
psychological data in sentencing procedures. These, in fact, were
grafted upon existing procedures. Two cases of which I learned
while in China provide good examples of where new sociological and
psychological data were used both in the determination of guilt and
in the determination of the appropriate sentence in a criminal trial
in China.
The Case of the Visiting Journalist
During my second visit to the People's Republic of China in
1977, I happened to meet an old friend who was then a member of
the International Press Corps, at the Peking Hotel. He told me of a
trial which had just ended in Peking. It involved a vicious attack on
a visiting African journalist by a Chinese national. The Chinese national had stabbed the African visitor on the neck while the visitor
was walking towards the Friendship Shop in the East City of Peking. At the trial it was established that the assailant had committed
similar attacks on two previous occasions on visitors. On each occasion he was sent to a labor camp for reform. On each occasion he
had responded to treatment and was sent back as a reformed per18.
19.
20.

THE LAND REFORM LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1950).

Id. at art. 1.
See note 17 supra.
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son. But at the time of trial it came to light that he was a committed
anti-state person who wished to do harm to the international image
of China. Although the African visitor had survived his injuries, the
Chinese assailant in question was sentenced to die "with immediate
effect" and was in fact executed some thirty minutes later. The
lesser sentence of death, which takes effect "after 24 months,"'"
which invariably leads to a commutation, was denied him. Being
somewhat anxious about the result, I took an opportunity to speak
to a colleague at the Faculty of Law at the University of Peking, a
recognized teacher in China of Criminal Law and Procedure. The
Chinese professor smiled and told me that I didn't actually understand the Chinese legal philosophy regarding crime and punishment.
Speaking through my interpreter, he said: "We have a different
outlook to crime than you have. Ours could be best expressed as 'a
slow slide to the bottom.' We do everything possible to correct and
rehabilitate the criminal and return him back to society. If we find
that the person cannot be rehabilitated because his criminality is too
basic-such as being political-then he has overcome the corrective
social blocks we have placed in his path towards reaching the bottom. He has made a determined attempt to hit the bottom. We have
no room for him." The assailant in the case of the African visitor appeared to have shown such a determination because of his anti-party
21. The Chinese criminal law and procedure draws a distinction between
crimes that carry death sentences to be carried out immediately and those to be carried out 24 months later. In the latter case, the condemned person is given an opportunity to rehabilitate himself within 24 months and thus avoid the supreme penalty.
This distinction could be traced initially to a set of instructions added by Mao Tse-tung
when he revised the draft resolution of the Third National Conference on Public
Security in May, 1951. The instructions read:
The number of counter-revolutionaries to be killed must be kept within
certain proportions. The principle to follow here is that those who owe
blood debts or are guilty of other extremely serious crimes and have to
be executed to assuage the people's anger and those who have caused extremely serious harm to the national interest must be unhesitantly
sentenced to death and executed without delay. As for those whose
crimes deserve capital punishment but who owe no blood debts and are
not bitterly hated by the people or who have done serious but not extremely serious harm to the national interest, the policy to follow is to
hand down the death sentence, grant a two-year reprieve and subject
them to forced labour to see how they behave. In addition, it must be explicitly stipulated that in cases where it is marginal whether to make an
arrest and that in cases where it is marginal whether to execute, under
no circumstances should there be an execution and that to act otherwise
would be a mistake.

5

SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

51 (1977). Note the sentences imposed on Jiang-

quing (Mao's widow) and Zhang Chunchiao at the end of the "gang of four" trial
(January, 1981).
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attitude. The Chinese law professor then proceeded to say that
Western jurisprudence would not allow the society to check a person's latent propensities towards the commission of a crime-for
that would affect his "civil liberties" or may breach the laws of false
imprisonment or libel. But when he harms the society by committing
a crime, it is then that the law permits the society to take heed of
his conduct. The professor emphasized that in his view: "Some innocent member of the western society must actually be harmed before
the society becomes interested in the ciiminal. He may well have
been seen to be moving swiftly towards the edge of the cliff-but he
must actually "fall off the cliff" and hit the bottom injuring both
himself and at least one other innocent person before the system apprehends him." I returned back to the Peking Hotel that evening
with the distinction between the Chinese attitude to crime 4nd
punishment, and ours, aptly rolled into one sentence. For the
Chinese the criminal law is concerned with "a slow slide to the bottom" while
for the West the concern is limited to "a falling off the
' =
cliff. "
The Case of the Young Man from ChengChow
Subsequently, I noticed that at a hearing in ChengChow in
Hanan province the court did take into consideration the
background of the accused and concluded that the accused was
suitable for rehabilitation rather than for punishment. This was a
case of a young man who had been brought up by his grandfather;
the accused had become an orphan at a very early stage of his life.
The community in which he lived looked upon him as an unfortunate.
Most of his deviant behavior, amounting to petty larceny of fruits or
chicken-for the purpose of his own food and not for sale-was
forgiven by the community. In the case before the Tribunal the
young man was accused of stealing a woman's money from her
wallet. The Court found that the community had forgiven all his
previous misdeeds because he was an orphan and this in fact was
the first time he had been brought before a Tribunal accused of a
crime, in spite of his past reprehensible conduct. The Tribunal,
therefore, concluded that "the society had not discharged its responsibility towards him by attempting to 'stop his slow slide to the bottom' and had in fact watched him go down with folded arms." The
Tribunal was, therefore, unwilling to convict or sentence him, but
merely ordered that he be recruited into the Chinese Railways and
given training which would lead him to employment in the State
22.

This is an excerpt from my notes made on Saturday, July 2, 1977.
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Railways. The Railways were recommended by the Tribunal because
the rural society from which he came had not trained him to work
on the farms, and besides, with the present cloud hanging over him
he might become the butt of some ridicule which might in turn force
him into a life of crime merely as an act of defiance.'
The 1977 Changes-The Modernizing Trend"'
The two cases when considered side by side show the way the
Tribunals in China determine the question of both guilt and punishment within the framework of the principle of "a slow slide to the
bottom." Present changes in China do not appear to alter these
basic propositions. The recent changes in the criminal law and
criminal procedure have merely streamlined the institutions which
investigate alleged offenses, and the channels through which offenses are brought before the courts. The creation for the first time,
in 1979, of a Ministry of Justice must help in regularizing the enforcement of criminal justice across the nation.
In addition, in 1979, the government introduced changes in the
law schools' curriculum, both at the Universities of Peking and of
Wuhan. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has now opened a
department for research in law and has plans to open its doors to
Western scholars. At the beginning of this year a law dictionary
containing both Chinese legal concepts and a compilation of laws has
been produced. The dictionary is now being translated into several
languages, English and French being two of them. All these matters
are mere encrustations upon the existing legal supra-structure and
are mainly meant as indicators of a modernizing trend moving China
as a whole into the third quarter of the twentieth century. Other indicators are flowing at a rapid pace from the Chinese Communist
Party itself. These are:
(i) The Joint Venture Law (July 8, 1979)
This is a result of the government's interest in increasing trade
and commerce with foreign trading concerns. The law requires
the foreign partner to introduce at least 25% of the capital
from outside resources. The law does not, as in other developing countries, state a maximum foreign investment. The law
23. This is an excerpt from my notes made on Wednesday, July 27, 1977.
24. This section is founded partly from materials recently obtained from Professor Gong Xiangrui, who is a faculty member of the Department of Law at the
University of Peking and Professor H. de-Pei of the Department of Law at the University of Wuhan, partly from interviews conducted with some diplomatic representatives
who had served their countries in Peking and through empirical research.
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fixes the income tax at 33% of the earned income and gives a
legal guarantee of protection of the foreign. investor's legal
rights and his interests.
(ii) Economic Laws
Since 1977 China has enacted a little more than 100 such laws.
In the main they deal with: national economic planning, basic
construction (land use planning and environment protection
rolled into one), economic contract (contractual undertakings
between government agencies and social organizations such as
communes or factories on the one hand and contracts between
foreign investors, inter se, on the other), patents, trademarks,
and building (mainly the health and safety aspects of buildings).
(iii) Other Changes
Statutory alterations of existing laws, such as the amendment
to the Marriage Law, have been passed. These changes are
generally of a peripheral nature such as raising the marriageable age to twenty-two for males and twenty for females.
There were changes made to the Constitution of 1978, and
these too appear to be minimal. They merely re-emphasized the
attributes of "The dictatorship of the proletariat" and declared
in emphatic terms: "[Tihat the Government of a socialist country would proceed to secure obedience not merely by imposing
punishments, but by persuasion, education and reformation."
The government appears to have no intention at the moment of
changing the Civil Law and the Civil Procedure Law of the country.
This leaves the settlement of disputes largely to be "handled according to policies and through mediation and consultation." 5 This requires popular participation, and the process of decentralization
which had begun during the early days of the revolution has now
manifested itself primarily in the system of communes, in which
more than three-quarters of the Chinese nation live. It is, therefore,
necessary at this stage to turn to the commune, which appears clearly
to be the basic socio-legal unit in China.
THE STRUCTURE AND THE ORGANIZATION

OF A BASIC SOCIO-LEGAL UNIT

In support of Mao Tse-tung's assertion"' that China is one vast
25. G. Xiangrui, Current Legislation in Modern China (paper presented by
Professor Xiangrui of the University of Peking at the Second International Congress
on Legal Science, September 7-12, 1980 in Amsterdam).
26. An oft-quoted statement by Chinese while greeting visitors from abroad.
The statement is alleged to have been made to a visiting dignitary in 1957.
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sociological laboratory, the "basic socio-legal unit" may be cited.
Relying on the Marxist theory of the fundamental relationship between the supra-structure and the infra-structure of a society," the
Chinese political theorists have structured a highly decentralized
system of government in which the politico-economic base strikes an
intimate relationship with the socio-legal institutions. It is the
reliance which the Chinese place on this system that has compelled
them to prepare, first, a politico-economic base sufficiently strong
and flexible to take the dead weight of a whole new legal system.
Before proceeding to examine and evaluate the role of law, it is
necessary to expose the structure and the organization of the "basic
socio-legal unit" which rests upon the politico-economic foundations
of the People's Republic of China.
The elements which form the modern Chinese society are
drawn from five sources. Arranged in the order of decreasing
economic importance are: the peasants, the workers, the cadres, the
service personnel and the students. Into one of these categories
must every one of the 900 million Chinese fall.
The Peasants
The peasants are now wholly based in communes. Prior to 1949
they were largely tenant farmers. Their relationship with the land
owners varied from one of a mere tenant who was required to
deliver a predetermined share of the produce, by way of rent, to one
of a quasi-slave or a serf, whose future income was pledged to the
land owner. The latter situation resulted from recurring bad
harvests or by recurring bouts of ill health, necessitating greater
borrowings and ever increasing debts. The dialectic of this situation
was widespread famine with its concommitant deaths. It is this sequence which has compelled writers on pre-1949 China to call her
the "sick man of Asia."
One of the earliest reforms undertaken by the new regime,
after 1949, was land reform. By Article 1 of the Land Reform Law 8
of 1950: "the feudal exploitative system of land ownership by landlord class shall be abolished and the system of peasant land ownership shall be introduced ... ." In creating "peasant land ownership"
out of lands that were once owned by the single landowners under
whom the peasants worked, the Chinese have maintained the former
geographical relationship between the tenant or serf and his farm;
27.
28.

D. LLOYD, supra note 15, at 729-30.
See note 18 supra.
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that is, the peasants continued to work on the same land on which
they had previously worked. That the Chinese peasantry was conceived within the geographical framework within which they and
their forefathers had lived, worked and died has been found crucial
to the structural integrity of the social system. The emotional and
the spiritual link with the land was found essential to the new society
they were helping to build and, therefore, the creation of the
Chinese communes, contrary to certain views, did not result in mass
human migrations.
Between 1950 and 1958, the Chinese peasantry were able, to
varying degrees, to claim a proprietary right over the produce. The
cumulative effect of the Land Reform Law was to transform a tenant into a produce-owner, allowing him varying degrees of ownership over the corpus. At one end of the scale one sees his absolute
ownership of farm products, obtained from "small plots [made available] for [his] personal needs-[and from] a small number of
livestock."' These rights are now guaranteed by the Constitution
and are limited to the circumscribed area of private property that each
commune may, under a collective agreement, allow. At the other end
of the scale, the peasant has only a collective right to the produce of
the commune. This right differs from both the traditional concepts
of co-ownership and joint-ownership in that, upon the death of a commune member, he is neither able to "will away" as he would in the case
of co-ownership, nor would he by his death enlarge the interests of
other individual commune members, as in the case of a jointownership. Instead his share in the communal property will simply
evaporate.' This process could be grounded partly on the socialist
principle: he who does not work, neither shall he eat, and from each
according to his ability, to each according to his work. It could also
be founded on the grounds that his right to the communal produce is
merely a usufruct, and as he owns not the corpus, his death would
terminate that usufruct.
Historical data are available to suggest that the march towards
the communization of China was a slow one. It had taken a decade to
achieve the starting point with the first commune in Chili-ying. At
the beginning, soon after the Land Reforms were first commenced
in 1950, the peasants worked in mutual-aid teams, which slowly
evolved into co-operatives. These, by a steady dialectical process of
evolution gave rise to the advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives. Two commentators on this growth process wrote:
29.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST. art. 7.

30.

This observation is culled from interviews conducted at communes.
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Mutual-aid teams and the elementary and advanced
agricultural producers' co-ops were the three forms of
organization evolved in China's agricultural co-operation
movement, representing specific and successively higher
stages of development.
The mutual-aid team, in which the land remained under
private ownership but the members helped one another
with manpower, draught animals, etc. on an exchange
basis, contained rudiments of socialism.
The elementary co-op was semi-socialist. Its members
were remunerated for the amount of work they did, and in
addition, drew appropriate dividends for their land,
draught animals and bigger farm implements which were
pooled in the co-op as shares and placed under its unified
management.
The advanced co-op was fully socialist. All the income of
its members came as a reward for their labor. Land and
other principled means of production were owned collectively and no dividends were paid for them."
By 1958, the advanced agricultural producers' co-operatives had
reached the gateway to communization. The next step required no
more than a structural change. The changing concepts of ownership
and possession in the Chinese law were linked to these structural
and organizational developments in the Chinese society. Together
with such changes, as were necessary to move the mutual-aid teams
into co-operatives and then into advanced co-operatives, in their
march towards the creation of rural communes, the society too had
undergone organizational changes of some considerable importance. 2
These organizational changes were found necessary not only to accommodate the commune concept of social organization but also to
lend institutional support to the type of social system which the
Chinese were developing. The result, therefore, was the creation of
a basic socio-legal unit which was also designed to function as a
socio-economic institution, and a political entity, sufficiently strong
and flexible to sustain a whole new socio-legal system. It is this that
makes the understanding of the commune system the key to an
understanding of the role of law in the People's Republic of China.

31.
32.

C. LI, T. CHIEH-YUAN, supra note 16, at 7.
Id. at 1-11.
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The Commune33
The commune is populated by four hundred thousand to six
hundred thousand persons. The principle function of a commune is
to coordinate the political and economic activities of the whole commune. Article 7 of the Constitution" reads: "The rural people's commune is an organization which integrates government administration and economic management. 3 5 In so doing, its alter ego is the
revolutionary committee. That committee functions as an executive
arm of the party, which is also the government. The. members of the
revolutionary committee of the commune are elected for a period of
two to three years. The evidence I possess supports the view that
the members can be re-elected and often are, unless some serious
deficiencies in their functions are brought into focus through "group
meetings." These group meetings appear to be a basic democratic
right open to all Chinese.
Each commune consists of about ten production brigades."
Each production brigade consists of nearly forty to sixty thousand
people. The duties and the functions of the production brigade are
somewhat amorphous. The brigade principally owns and runs the
heavy industries and heavy industrial equipment. It owns the tractors, the lorries, the earth moving plants, and commune factories or
mechanical workshops. In some instances the production brigade
(and not the commune) runs the commune's health services. Often,
the secondary schools fall under the governance of the production
brigade. It is also concerned with cultural and sports activities.
There is again a revolutionary committee at the brigade level which
runs the affairs of the brigade. Unlike the commune revolutionary
committee to which reference has already been made, the brigade
committee is more of a housekeeping organ. Little or no concrete
33. This section is written from empirical research. The Chili-ying commune
which was the first to be recognized (not necessarily the first to be created), North of
Chengchow, in Honan province on the Northern Bank of the Yellow River is regarded
as one of the smallest of the communes in China. That commune was atypical in that it
had no more than about one-tenth the average population for a typical commune. The
Chili-ying commune produced the following figures:
38
Production Brigades
298
Production Teams
53,200
People
9,100
Households
93,000
Acres (Mu) of Cultivated Land
34. See note 29 supra.
35. Id.
36. In this respect the Chili-ying commune is also atypical. See note 33 supra.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/4

Marasinghe: An Empiricist's View of the Chinese Legal System
1981]

CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM

political decisions are taken at this level. It has no legislative, executive or judicial powers either. The members of the brigade
revolutionary committee are elected for a period of two years. It is,
however, not clear as to whether they can be re-elected.
Except in the Chili-ying People's Commune, in every people's
commune in China, the brigade is not the smallest social unit, there
are also production teams. For historical reasons, the Chili-ying People's Commune, however, stopped its multi-sectioning process at the
brigade level. Apart from Chili-ying, in all communes there are
about ten production teams in each brigade. Each production team
consists of four to six thousand persons. Commenting on production
teams, Li and Chieh-Yuan"7 wrote:
In ownership, the people's communes also have three
levels, with the production team as the basic one. This
means that the commune, brigade and production team
each own part of the means of production; but the land,
the most important, belongs to the team. Hence the
distribution of income also takes place mainly within the
team which is the basic accounting unit. (In a number of
places, the Brigade is beginning to play this role.)
Take for instance the No. 29 Production Team-It
has 310 mu of land and 18 draught animals as well as a
thresher, crusher, etc. They are collectively owned by its
commune members of 36 households. The members work
in the team and the income is distributed among them in
line with the socialist principle, "from each according to
his ability, to each according to his work."
The Brigade owns some of the larger means of production, too expensive for the average team to buy. They
include such items as tractors and larger irrigation and
drainage equipment. All are used in helping constituent
teams with their production."
These characteristics of the production team are now embodied in
Article 7 of the 1975 Constitution.3 9 The alter ego of the production
team is its revolutionary committee. This revolutionary committee
is elected for a period of one year, and is not as a general rule, re-

37.
38.
39.

C. Li, T. CHIEH-YUAN, supra note 16.
Id. at 11.
See note 29 supra.
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elected. The theory behind this, is that since it is the basic social
unit, its functions are sufficiently important that the members of the
revolutionary committee may be exposed to the corrupting influence
of power, and therefore, it is believed that they should not be permitted to occupy a tenured position on the committee. Therefore, an
attempt is always made to rotate the membership on the committee
as much as possible, so as to provide most of its members an opportunity to sit on it. In addition, it is required of the committee
members at the production team level to subscribe to a minimum of
about 17% of the normal production norm. This level appears to be
common to most communes which I visited.
The production team performs many functions. It is the basic
social unit. Insofar as it superintends the economic facets of commune life, it functions as the basic accounting unit. Insofar as it integrates the four to six thousand persons into a single cohesive
society, by providing a forum for consultations, debates and discussions, it functions as a consultative unit. Insofar as it performs the
administration of government, it functions as a basic socio-legal unit.
And insofar as it integrates the society of four to six thousand persons into a common political theme (by education, debate and discussion) it functions as a basic political unit. It is now necessary to examine each of these functions separately and then attempt to synthesize them into a single coherent whole. The latter would lead to a
clearer understanding of their interrelations and to the manner in
which they fit into the core-theory of Marxist legal science, namely
the "supra-structure-infra-structure" relationship. In this
paradigm, the socio-legal rules occupy the supra-structure, while the
politico-economic base of The People's Republic of China provides
the infra-structure. This politico-economic base is largely derived
from an interpretation of the works of Marx, Lenin and Engels in
the light of the writings and opinions expressed by Mao Tse-tung."°
In a sum total, and in a functional sense, the production team, may
appear as the epitomy of a basic socio-legal unit. It is to the
aforementioned functions that we must now turn.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRODUCTION TEAM

An Economic Unit
As an economic unit, the team controls the production quotas,
receives the monies arising out of selling the produce from such
quotas, and conducts the accounting procedures as a prelude to the
40.

1-5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG (1977).
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distribution of profits. A portion of the income in terms of both
money and grain are banked. These are the accumulations put aside
for unforeseen exigencies and are commune property, which the
revolutionary committee holds in trust for its members. Although
more detailed exposition of this role is beyond the scope of this article, it must, however, be mentioned, that the role of the production
team as a basic economic unit would be very relevant to an analysis
of the commune economy. Our concern principally is one of law,
which in effect excludes the need for any exhaustive statement on
the economic role of this basic social unit.
A Consultative Unit
Although its economic functions are often given greater prominence by the Chinese themselves, the role that the production
team plays, as a basic democratic unit in a largely consultative
capacity, merits particular attention. The production teams are normally grouped into seven contingents of about 800-900 persons in
each. Each contingent is required to meet on two half days per
week. These meetings, known as "group meetings," provide a forum
for debate and discussion. Some of these debates and discussions are
in the nature of complaints against the local, district or provincial
party organizations or against their officers. This is also the forum
in which their own revolutionary committees come under close
scrutiny. Complaints against working conditions and their fellow
workmates come to be aired. This scrutiny, criticisms and the inevitable airing of group thoughts often take the form of both suggestions for reform and change.
In this role, the group meetings evolve guidelines for the running of associated institutions, such as health stations (work clinics),
nursery schools and shops. Further, its consultative role includes
the organization and execution of the electoral process. The electoral process here in question includes the elections to the revolutionary committees at the brigade, commune, and production team
levels.
An Administrative Unit
It is this function that interests us most. In this role the production team, in groups of about 900, engage in legislative, executive and socio-legal work. The units both suggest new ideas as
bases for new rules and receive central party decisions from the
"politburo" for adoption. These two functions require separate treatment.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/4
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The former responsibility, that of suggesting new ideas as
bases for new rules, is satisfied principally through group meetings.
At such meetings, the production team may formulate new ideas
which may have a beneficial bearing for the commune, the district,
or the province to which it belongs. Sometimes, as was the case during the Cultural Reyolution of 1966, the rural communes may be the
source of nationwide trends. Particularly during the Cultural Revolution, many new resolutions affecting the whole country
originated at the team level. Now, since the saga of "the gang of
four," 1 many resolutions of a general nature regarding production
norms and educational standards are also originating from the team
level. These resolutions appear to have a nationwide effect. In any
event, the production team at group meetings debate and discuss
these new ideas. In many instances, these ideas are discussed in
small groups, outside the caucas meetings of 900. Eventually, these
suggestions are evolved into a concrete resolution. The discussions
on the resolution are equally detailed and extensive. The resolution
is finally passed individually and independently by each of the
groups of the production team. Thereafter the forum of discussion
shifts to the commune level.
At that, the entire commune meets in several manageable sessions. These are ongoing consultative sessions and the responsibility
to organize and coordinate them is left in the hands of the revolutionary committee of the commune. Once it is adopted by the commune, the resolution proceeds to the district level, and then to the
provincial level. Finally it reaches the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China. District committees and the provincial
committees are essentially administrative organs of the Communist
Party. These are, therefore, government organs and as such are not
elective. They are appointed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and function largely as amanuenses of the Political
Bureau. Their functions do not include the rejection of the resolutions, but merely a duty to comment on them. These committees,
therefore, merely state an opinion as to whether the resolution in
question falls into line with the general developmental pattern of
that district or province. Their comments will deal with the need for
such legislation and will assess the affect it would have upon the
politico-economic structure of their districts or provinces. They will
not be concerned with the social implications because that would be
a matter falling logically within the competence of the production
41. Namely, jiang Quing (Mao Tse-tung's widow), Zhang Chun-chiao, Yao
Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen (all politburo members).
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team and the commune. Once the resolution goes beyond the commune, the district and the provincial committees are required merely
to view the resolution from a purely politico-economic standpoint,
which in effect provides the le fondement for China. With these comments, the resolution and the accompanying opinions reach the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party.
What precisely occurs at the level of the Political Bureau is
largely conjectural. However, there is some indication that at the
Political Bureau the resolution receives careful study so as to
evaluate its probable socio-economic implications. Further, an attempt is made to restate "the pith and substance" of the resolution
in Marxist terms. It must not be forgotten that the particular brand
of Marxism currently practiced in China, is Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by the writings of the late Chairman, Mao Tse-tung.
Unless the pith and the substance of the resolution has some central significance to the core policies of the Communist Party, the
Political Bureau may, without reference to the Central Committee,
make a final decision as to its acceptability. However, if the resolution falls into the area of policy which has a core-relationship to the
party, then it is believed that the Central Committee of the Communist Party will be consulted. It is not clear as to how many of
such members and in what manner those consultations occur.
Though conjecture, it is generally believed that during the life of
Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai these consultations did not go beyond
him. The final outcome of the work done to the resolution by the
Political Bureau is the formulation of what is known as "the mass
line.""' This is no more than a policy directive based on the pith and
the substance of the original resolution. The mass line travels down
to the production team that first originated the resolution. In. this
journey downwards, the provincial, district and the commune committees are merely informed of the mass line; they apparently are
not consulted.
It is possible that the mass line may represent generally the
pith and substance of the original resolution. If it does, the production team, again in groups, will resolve to adopt it. Such an adoption
will, from that moment of time and without more, transform the
mass line into a rule of law. At this point too, the units in their
group discussions will have another opportunity to debate, discuss
and thereby more thoroughly understand the rule. If the mass line
were to emerge in a form in which it is required to be adopted
42.

J.R.

TOWNSEND,
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generally throughout the provinces, districts or the commune, then
the mass line, insofar as the other production teams in the commune, the district or the province are concerned, would be received
by way of a central committee directive attracting separate considerations. As we have mentioned before this will receive separate
treatment later.
This two-way process, which Mao describes as "bottom-up and
top down,"43 together with the fairly extensive opportunities made
available for debates and discussions, fulfill one of the basic Marxist
requirements for enacting law, ie., the educative process. It is suggested that the communication of a law is one thing, but an
educated understanding of it is another, and perhaps a more important function. Through this type of popular participation, the
Chinese have attempted to lay down a basis for the educative process of law. It is suggested that this type of popular participation
appears largely to lessen the need for policing the effective implementation of the law, which has by now become a product of the
popular will. To that extent, its observance should appear as a
logical step towards implementing a popular decision taken by the
whole production team.
Sometimes the mass line may be at variance with the pith and
substance of the original resolution. In such an event, the production
team that initiated the process has the option of not adopting the
mass line. It is here that the full thrust of the political forces behind
the team comes into play. The issue, thereafter, becomes political.
From this point of time there are a number of options available to
the team to oppose the deviant mass line. The most popular step
that a team normally takes is to lobby the district and the provincial
committees of the Communist Party. As the amanuenses of the
Political Bureau, the district and the provincial committees could,
after consultations with the Political Bureau, revise the original
mass line. Besides this, the production team has the power to have
the matter raised at the Party congresses both at the district level
and at the provincial level. Another political alternative is to attract
the attention of the media. Dr. Li" has recently examined the extent
to which the media is now becoming available as a channel for dissent.'

43. A frequently used Chinese term for a process leading to the popular participation in political activities.

44.

V.

45.

Id. at 81-89 (Kuo's case).

LEE, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS (1977).
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The second of the functions of the production team as an administrative unit occurs when a mass line originates from a decision
taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Here, different policy considerations come into play. Such a mass line is none
other than the distinctive and the deliberate policy of the Communist Party of China, which in effect is the government. In such instances, the production teams, as basic socio-legal units, are required
to adopt the mass line and thereby create new law. This type of
mass line is common. With every shift of political emphasis at the
top, a mass line comes down to the basic socio-legal unit. It is this
that makes a study of the substantive rules of Chinese law somewhat unreal, for what is certain are the procedures for creating law,
but not the law itself. As for the latter, there is a tendency to
change the law with the changing impulses at the center of political
power. Aside from the ability of the basic socio-legal units to delay
by prevarication the adoption of this type of mass line, they have
per se no room to outmaneuver the policy decisions of the Central
Committee. There is the power to lobby its repeal with the district
committees and the provincial committees. But that is an activity
after the fact; that is, after it has already been adopted by the Central Committee. Aside from it being a political decision originating
at the level of the Central Committee of the Party, this second type
of mass line may well be the transformation of a resolution
originating at the level of a particular production team in one area
of the country, into law. The Political Bureau may seize upon such a
resolution which they consider eminently suitable for a whole commune, a whole district, a whole province, or even for the whole country and therefore adopt it as a political decision of the Central Committee of the Party. At that point, a mass line may originate from
the Political Bureau directing particular communes, districts, provinces or the entire country to adopt a particular line of action. Such
mass lines are not that infrequent particularly during times of major
social transformations, such as during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) or during the present period of modernization.
It is important to bear in mind that the production team is one
of the basic socio-legal units in China. In addition to its functions as
a law-creating organ, it is also a law-enforcing organ. In this respect,
there are no particular individuals charged with the specialized function of maintaining law and order. Concommitant with popular participation in the law-creating process is the popular interest that the
rules of the law are indeed observed, for the greater good of the
production team. It is, therefore, suggested that popular participation in the enactment of law to a large measure dispenses with the
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/4
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need for a specialized agency to constantly oversee its effective enforcement. This is so as long as the rules of law conform to something like the "felicitous calculus" of Bentham." However, should the
need arise, the revolutionary committee of the production team has
the power to call in the members of the public security station, .e.,
the police, whenever it appears to be necessary. It seems clear that
during times of political stress, the work of the revolutionary committee in maintaining law and order has been strengthened by the
members of the public security stations. The attitude of the party is
that, such a need reflects a general malaise among the members of
the production team. Every effort is, therefore, made to internalize
the problem and solve it through sustained political education and
by peer pressure in the first instance. However, where the deviant
behavior is by a single member or by a small group of members, and
the behavior is sufficiently grave as to involve personal injury or injury to private or commune property, the revolutionary committees
may decide to hand over the matter to the public security organs,
leading to criminal proceedings before the established system of
courts.'7 That will be a necessary prelude to initiating trial pro"cedures, without which a conviction followed by a sentence cannot
be obtained. In view of the fact that the dispute settling functions of
the revolutionary committees are limited to mediation and conciliation, they have neither the power to convict nor the power to impose any particular sentence. Their powers are channeled towards
political education and rehabilitation. Their instrumentalities work
in conjunction with peer pressure. The two following cases should
show, to some extent, how this mediation and conciliation works.
Case (1): This took place in a commune at the foot of the TaiHang Mountains in Honan Province a few miles from Tsien-Shin on
the northern banks of the Yellow River.
Facts: H and W were married. There was a son and a daughter
by that marriage. The parties were living with H's mother K. H
died. W, the widow, and the children continued to live with K. In
the middle of 1976, W re-married. Z. Z had no connection with W's
former husband's family. W went to live with Z. K refused to hand
over her deceased son's children. Had W sought the instrumen46. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-13 (1970).
47. Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, 16 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNATIONAL L. 1-103 (1977). Professor Edwards culls his information from old legal
textbooks, emigre interviews and Chinese newspaper accounts to describe the criminal
process in China.
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talties of the established courts, she would have been awarded the
custody of the children. Through the organs of the state, the
children would have been delivered to her. The revolutionary committee persuaded W to seek mediation. They did this partly through
compassion for K who had nothing left in this world except her son's
children and partly to achieve some kind of harmony between W
and K. By May, 1977, K had agreed to let her granddaughter go and
had established cordial relations with W and with Z. The chairman
of the revolutionary committee was confident that there would be a
breakthrough regarding K's grandson. K and Z had begun to see
each other and K was thinking of moving in with W and Z, which
would then put an end to the dispute.
The mediation had taken over a year. The form of mediation
was a combination of peer pressure and discussion. The argument
was goal-oriented, the goal being to bring the two families together.
What was needed was to satisfy K that her emotional attachment to
the two children would be respected by both W and Z and by the
whole community. This is where the revolutionary committee sought
peer pressure to assure K and assail her fears. This could have been
impossible, they say, had W sought the instrumentalities of the law.
The revolutionary committee first had to win W over to their point
of view before embarking on the processes of mediation. According
to the view expressed by the chairman of the revolutionary committee the fact that all parties were known to the community and the
fact that the whole community was behind the idea of mediation as
distinct from litigation had helped enormously in this venture.
Case (2): This took place in the West China Street, in Peking
and concerned the West China Street neighborhood committee. X
and Y lived on opposite sides of the same street. Their children
played together. There were certain disputes among the children,
and X and Y were both drawn into the dispute. X and Y, who were
both housewives, became enemies. X was a seamstress and Y worked
as a cadre in a department store. One day in April, 1977, X shortcircuited the fuse in Y's fuse box. There was an electricity failure.
The matter was essentially criminal, but the neighborhood committee decided to mediate and reconcile, rather than prosecute. By a
process of mediation the parties have been reconciled.
This line of approach adopted by the revolutionary committee
was by appealing to the class roots of the two disputants. Both X
and Y had grown up as housemaids in a wealthy Chinese home.
Their parents 'were illiterate and were employed as "coolies." Both
X and Y had the same class background, and before 1949, both were
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/4
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economically and socially oppressed. They were, therefore, class
sisters and not class enemies. The fact they had become enemies
was by a mistaken interpretation of their roles as class sisters.
Their duty was not to extend the disputes of their children but to
extinguish them by mediation and by peer pressure. This they
should have done alone or with the help of the neighborhood committee. Instead of terminating one dispute, they were told that they
had extended it to two. Such a path was a dangerous path. And,
therefore, they should recognize their roles as class sisters and work
towards harmony and good neighborliness. This line of mediation,
supported by peer pressure, within a very short time brought them
back to their original roles.
These two examples merely indicate the mediation role that
the basic socio-legal unit plays in China.
A Political Unit
Political education is a necessary step towards the effective implementation of Marxism. The importance of political education has
been emphasized by many commentators on Marxist political theory.
In a recent commentary on the Chinese legal process, Professor Edwards 8 wrote: "The theme which is stressed perhaps most openly
and often in Chinese political propaganda js the need to consolidate
and strengthen the proletarian dictatorship. A grasp of the meaning
of this term is essential to the understanding of both the theory and
the reality of the contemporary Chinese legal process."'9
To a degree, success in the establishment of the dictatorship of
the proletariat may be achieved by the utilization of force. The
reliance the revolutionaries placed on armed struggle was a necessary stage through which China had passed. However, 1966-76 was a
period of consolidation for China. The need to strengthen and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat was uppermost in their
minds. Consolidation became of foremost importance the moment
the dictatorship was established, which could have been before the
commencement of the Cultural Revolution of 1966. The Chinese considered the need to consolidate as particularly crucial at that period
of time. They viewed the work of what they called the "gang of
four," in the wake of the death of the "Big Three"' in 1976, as pos48. Id.
49. Id. at 46.
50. Namely, Marshall Chu-Teh (the Defense Minister and one-time
commander-in-chief of the Red Army) Chou-en-lai (the Prime Minister) and Mao Tsetung (the Chairman of the Party).
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ing a significant internal threat to the social fabric of the nation. In
their view, such threats could be best repelled by a correct understanding of the dialectical process of political evolution and not by
any form of armed struggle. They, therefore, placed a heavy burden
upon the production unit and such other socio-legal units to conduct
mass education. Aside from this particular need at this peculiar
stage of Chinese history, namely the period of the Cultural Revolution, the need for continuing political education had throughout the
years of Communist rule, become one of the more important functions of the basic socio-legal unit. As we shall see later, political
education occupies a central and a coordinating position in the
Chinese legal model.
THE URBAN BASIC SOCIO-LEGAL UNIT
The foregoing is an exposition of the rural Chinese society, taking the production team as the basic soc.io-legal unit. Besides the
production team there are many other socio-legal units, particularly
in the urban areas. These are linked to the worker, cadre, serviceman, and student classifications of the Chinese society. In each
case, each member within these classifications belongs to two sets of
socio-legal units. First, each member belongs to the socio-legal unit
at his or her place of work. The concern of this unit is basically over
problems associated with the type of work they perform. Except in
the case of the socio-legal unit of the students, all other socio-legal
units have powers co-extensive with those that have been adumbrated for the production team. In the case of students, they appear
to be endowed with a limited law-creating power. This power is
limited to interpersonal relationships and does not extend, at least
after the dethronement of the "gang of four," to such matters as
those affecting their educational institutions.-' However, even those
law-creating powers at the interpersonal level are limited by the
students' level of maturity. Subject to this fact, revolutionary committees representing the socio-legal unit even of nurseries do exist.
In spite of these limitations, their powers of mediation and conciliation, together with their executive powers, remain untrammelled. It
can only be assumed that the socio-legal units in the public security
stations and in and among service establishments function similarly
51. One of the charges made against the "Gang of Four," see note 41 supra,
was that they tampered with the orderly progression of educational establishments by
encouraging the students to participate in the running of schools. This trend was particularly widespread in 1975. By 1977, after the dethronement of the "Gang of Four,"
the trend had been reversed.
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to the production teams, for these two segments of the Republic's
armed forces are to a very large extent communized. Although the
main focus here is on the administrative functions of the basic sociolegal unit, such units for these groups also perform the functions of
an accounting unit, a consultative unit and a political unit. The alter
ego of these basic units are the "revolutionary committees," elected
in each case for a period of one year. In this aspect too, they resemble the general structure of the production team.
One basic distinction between the organization of the production team among the peasants and the basic socio-legal units among
the other four classifications52 requires emphasis. Unlike in the case
of production units, the social situation prevailing in the factories,
the department stores, the public security stations, together with
the service barracks and the schools, is such that the citizen's life in
these social compartments is shared between the work place and
home. Insofar as the issues connected with their homes are concerned, their nexus is with the neighborhood committees and with
the residents' committees.
The particular neighborhood committees with which I was
associated were within the municipal limits of Peking. They were
the Western-City Neighborhood Committee and the Liantzu Residents Revolutionary Committee, both in Peking. Exposing the structure from the top-down one sees a pyramidical model developing. At
the top of the neighborhood social structure is the Municipal Revolutionary Committee of Peking. Unlike other cities, Peking is a
municipality and does not belong to any particular province or district. Corresponding with the rural commune structure, the Municipal Revolutionary Committee may be compared with provincial
revolutionary committees. With reference to any other city, such as
Kwangchow, the Municipal Revolutionary Committee of Peking will
be paralleled by the Provincial Revolutionary Committee of the
Kwangtung Province. Immediately below the Municipal Revolutionary Committee is the District Municipal Revolutionary Committee of Peking. This is again comparable to the district revolutionary
committee associated with the communes. With reference to any
other city, it could be compared to the district revolutionary committee of the district in which the city was located. Below the
District Municipal Revolutionary Committee stands the Western City
Neighborhood Committee. This is comparable with the revolutionary
52. Namely, cadres (white collar workers including teachers), workers (blue
collar workers, "hard hats" and factory hands), service personnel (the combined armed
forces of the army. navy, the airforce and the students).
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committee of a commune. All cities have neighborhood revolutionary
committees, like the one here in question, and they each perform the
same type of coordinating role as does the revolutionary committee
of a commune. The basic socio-legal unit is the residents' committee,
whose alter ego is its revolutionary committee. Its parallel is the
production team.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
FOR THE CITY OF PEKING
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In the hierarchical structures of neighborhood committees outside Peking, municipal and the district municipal committees are not
found. The neighborhood committees in cities outside Peking fall
directly under the district revolutionary committee of the relevant
district. These committees coordinate the activities not only of the
rural communes and their socio-legal units, but also those of the urban residential areas. Peking is the only anomaly, for it belongs
neither to a province nor to a district. It is a mere municipality. The
Western City Neighborhood Committee has thirty-five residents'
committees within it. Liantzu Residents Revolutionary Committee is
one of them. This residents' committee extends its control over
three lanes, 690 households, and over a group constituting a basic
socio-legal unit of 2400 persons. This basic socio-legal unit was
almost half the average size of a similar unit in a rural commune,
namely a production team. The allocation of power between the
residents' committees and the neighborhood committee appear to
adopt the same pattern as that between the commune and the production team. Similar to the production team, the residents' committee functions as a basic accounting unit. It receives rents where
rents are charged. It keeps the utilities functioning and maintains
the general cleanliness of the area. The residents usually meet in
groups of 300, once a week. These meetings take place at times
when the participants are free from work. Their group discussions
are less effusive and less formal than those conducted by the production teams. This fact is explainable on the grounds that the
issues submitted for discussion at residents' group meetings are
more pedestrian and more localized than the issues that go before a
group meeting of a production team. Unlike the production team
groups, the residents' groups have very few policy or economic matters to consider. There are no work norms, production norms, production costs, or transport and communication problems. The
residents often have the alternative of discussing issues of policy
and economics at the group meetings held at their place of work. A
large portion of the time spent at neighborhood meetings is devoted
to political discussions. Aside from these functions, the resident
groups take part in mediation work, under the general umbrella of
the neighborhood committee. Although comparative figures are not
available, the residents' groups seemingly mediate more in domestic
disputes than in other types of disputes, unlike a revolutionary committee of a production team in a rural commune. This fact can be attributed to the increasing stresses of urban living causing domestic
disruptions.
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It may sometimes appear that the importance placed upon the
economic, consultative, administrative and political roles of this urban socio-legal unit is less than the recognition given to similar roles
played by the rural socio-legal units, namely the production teams.
But the fact that the urban Chinese may have two independent
parts to play (one in his place of work and one in his neighborhood)
does tend to make the one socio-legal unit appear less important
than the other. The general paradigm of governance, however, remains unchanged. The urban social structure and the rural social
structure play the same type of role; namely, to provide an institutional framework within which the socio-legal system of China may
be conceived. Both the urban and the rural societies provide a
politico-economic base structurally suitable to receive the deadweight of a whole new socio-legal system. The nexus that links the
rural components with the urban components of the Chinese society
is their common politico-economic base, where both its political
theory and its economic theory may be traced to a common source,
that is, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism.
REFLECTIONS

It is necessary at this stage to attempt the construction of a
model to explain the interrelationships of this mass of empirical
data. It is necessary to search for an answer as to what purposes
have predicated the development of these types of socio-economic institutions-the production units, the residents' groups and work
place groups. Are their roles, which have been adumbrated earlier,
designed to play independent parts or interdependent parts? Do
they in some way fall into this gigantic jig-saw puzzle which China
appears to be? And within the parameters of their own preordained
roles, do they appear to function well?
In any system of rules, there always exists a relationship between the source of rule-making power and the legal bureaucracy
which inter alia enforces the rules. The latter are the various legal
institutions ranging from a judge or a lawyer to a jailor. The
sources of law are the traditional law-creating organs recognized as
such by the legal system. There is also a relationship between the
source of rule-making power and the citizen. This relationship is the
corollary to the first relationship. When a rule is made, two types of
directives move outwards. One directive conveys to the citizen a
message as to what activities are permitted and what are prohibited. The other directs the legal bureaucracy as to how they
should act, depending on the response the citizen makes to the
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/4

Marasinghe: An Empiricist's View of the Chinese Legal System
19811

CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM

directive addressed to him. In one form or another the citizen, the
rule-making power, and the legal bureaucracy become linked to form
a grand triangle. This could be by way of a sanction, where the
directive to the citizen contains a criminal prohibition. Alternatively,
the directive could be one of facilitative law, where provision has
been made for a remedy, or the enforcement or recognition of a
right (such as a rule of contract law, a rule relating to the making of
wills, a rule concerning marriage or divorce, or some other broadbased non-criminal matter). In this way a triangular model will
result. But this does not represent the complete picture.
THE THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE SOCIO-LEGAL MODEL5

External

Stimuli/

Law Creating
Organ

3 LegalRemedy
Z

Bureaucracy

Sanction

Citize

At each angle of this triangle are human agencies performing
the functions of the institutions they represent. Human beings function as law makers, legal bureaucrats and as "role occupants." In
53.
REVIEW

Seidman, Law and Development General Model, LAW AND SOCIETY

316-324 (1972).
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each of these capacities, human beings drawn from varying socioeconomic backgrounds, espousing varying political ideologies, practicing varying ethical or religious beliefs nurtured in different
cultural milieus, may perform the key functions. Subject to all manner of prejudices and biases, each role in this triangular relationship
may be played from a heuristic standpoint. Denoting each group of
external stimuli that affect the human agencies at each angle of the
triangle by the letter Q, we will have three such groups, Q1, Q2 and
Q3 to contend with. The pressures Q1, Q2 and Q3, as a rule, are not
the same. Therefore, the framework within which the law is created
may differ from the framework with reference to which the law is
judged. Both these criteria of reference may differ from the conscious attitude of the citizen who is required to respond to the law.
His frame of reference, which we may call Q3, would differ from
both Q1, and Q2, Q1 being the frame of reference of the law makers
and Q2 being that of the legal bureaucracy. This lack of congruence
in legal systems has often been noted as the reason for the lack of
any functional harmony within them. The corollary to this must be
that a system which approaches a functional equality among Q1, Q2
and Q3, must produce the highest degree of internal consistency, the
least degree of breaches or violations, and the best opportunity for
achieving a stable legal order. That must surely be axiomatic.
Where there is a substantial disparity between Q1 and Q2, the
legal system tends to become dysfunctional. The adjudicatory process will have little or no relevance to the goals and purposes
espoused by the law creating organs. This could place an inordinate
strain upon the socio-legal model.
A substantial difference between the stimuli Q1 and Q3 could
lead to an incessant breach of the law. It would result in tension between the citizen and the law creating organ, which could be injurious to the stability of the society.
A difference between the stimuli grouped under Q2 and Q3
could create a breakdown in the legal order. This could lead to such
social strains as those witnessed in the United States during the
height of the Vietnam War.
The best model for development is one where Q1, Q2 and Q3
approximates equality. The further they move away from congruency, the greater will be the internalized strain upon the system.
In such circumstances, the role of the civil libertarians will be to
engage themselves in prevailing exclusively upon the law creating
agencies to correct the imbalance in the legal system. But their role
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is not one of adjusting the external stimuli so as to bring about an
approximate equality among Q1, Q2 and Q3. The role of the civil
libertarians during a time of increasing stress and strain is a difficult one. This difficulty becomes compounded when their work succeeds in getting a change of the law at Q1, for that could, in a sense,
create a greater tension for the legal bureaucracy, with an adverse
affect on the citizen. The need is to harmonize the forces comprising
of Q1, Q2 and Q3 rather than to change the existing laws by altering
the assumptions upon which Q1 operates as the supreme law creating agency. This is not a role which the lawyers or the law reformers are equipped to play. It is a role for those engaged in the
area of socio-economic reform. It is this truism that has guided the
Chinese communist party, leading it to prepare, as a prelude to the
changes that were introduced since 1966, a socio-economic structure
locked into a common political philosophy. The ideas regarding socioeconomic organization in China were derived from a common
political creed. To that extent, the party has provided the country
with a common foundation. It is upon this common base that the
socio-legal supra-structure rests. The common denominator which
underpins the functionaries at the three apices of the triangle are
therefore subjected to certain types of stimuli which are, or are at
least assumed to be, common to all. By a process of consistent reeducation, it is believed that the equilibrium among the several
forces can be maintained. Any shifts in the stimuli must be gentle
and programmed. The disquieting tendencies recently rumbling out
of China are indicative of changes that have occurred suddenly and
unexpectedly. The fact that they were neither gentle nor programmed has led, in some quarters, to a breakdown of certain
stabilizing aspects of the society. That fact alone is supportive of the
general thesis that the cornerstones of a stable basic socio-legal unit
could be founded principally upon a common socio-economic base. It
is this that makes the Chinese model somewhat attractive to the
developing Third World while being a threat to the stability of the
First World; the First World institutions have been derived from
different philosophical bases and rest on very different foundations.
As such, neither the institutions by themselves nor the foundations
by themselves could now be changed without changing the entire
socio-economic system. That means both the socio-economic
substrata and the institutions of the supra-structure would have to
be changed. It is this that makes any comparison between the
Chinese system and any other system unreal. Equally unreal will be
an attempt to evaluate the Chinese system in the light of any other
system. The core-question simply is one of functionality within its
own framework.
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Postulating the foregoing model to explain the functions and
the purposes of the basic socio-legal unit in China, it becomes evident that harmony through internal consistency appears to be its
avowed goal. By subjecting the law-creating organs, the lawenforcing and adjudicating organs, and the vast multitude of the
citizenry to the same kind of external stimuli denoted by Q, the
Chinese basic socio-legal unit appears to be an attempt to achieve
approximate equality among the three types of institutions" that a
legal system must necessarily possess. In the Chinese model, decentralization appears to be the key that maintains uniformity in the
type of stimuli which fashions the frame of reference within which
the three roles are played. Once an internal congruence is struck
among these three elements, then it could be assumed that this congruence would lead to internal stability; for the criteria that leads to
law making, will be the criteria that would guide law enforcement
and adjudication. This same criteria would determine the degree to
which it is beneficial to obey the rules. And in the final analysis, it
is the same society that plays these three roles, but against different scenes. The fact that every actor in each of these three roles
is assumed to come from a common socio-economic background,
which espouses common political goals, is said to be fundamental to
the success of the dispute settlement process in China.
It is this fact that places a limit upon the concepts of freedom
in China, a concern of civil libertarians elsewhere, by subjecting individual rights to a highly politicized code of social ethics, derived
from Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. The security and the maintenance of this frame of reference is fundamental to the maintenance of
modern China. It is this that makes anti-party activities under the
Chinese law tantamount to anti-state activities elsewhere.
There is another aspect of this model which merits attention.
The pivotal point which the external stimuli occupy, leading to internal stability, permits the agency which controls the stimuli to effectuate social change within a revolutionary framework by merely adjusting the external stimuli according to social needs. It is this that
makes the interdependence of the various roles that the production
units play, an important one. It is this interdependence which leads
to the interplay of several extralegal forces which ultimately determine the goals of the basic socio-legal units. These goals often
broaden into the grand design and purposes of the Chinese legal
54. Namely, the law creating institutions, the institutions which form the
legal bureaucracy and the citizens of the vast social institution-the human society.
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system as a whole. The goals themselves may determine the nature
and the character of the rules of law. Goals are constantly in a state
of flux in China, and will remain so, so long as the evolutionary process of Chinese institutions remain linked to the notion of the
"continuing revolution" within the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The law and legal institutions too must accordingly change, with the
change of emphasis of the assumptions upon which the Chinese
society rests at the level of the infra-structure.
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